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ABSTRACT
The questions of whether and how to regulate the Internet have been a topic
of serious political discussion for some time now. In many ways the discussion is
actually much older than the Internet itself, as the situation at hand has strong
parallels to both the telegraph and the telephone. The question of Net Neutrality
is one small part of that discussion. Net Neutrality is, in essence, a broad principle
that says Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should not alter the quality of service
based on the origin or type of traffic.
In chapters 2 and 3 I examine the economic effect of possible Net Neutrality
regulations in a number of different markets. Since an enormous number of Inter-
net based businesses rely on either direct sales or a subscription model, chapter 1
focuses on businesses with a direct financial connection between content providers
and consumers. I show that while priority service can increase efficiency, if the Inter-
net Service Provider can charge for priority it has a strong incentive to distort the
content providers’ market and little incentive to increase infrastructure investment.
v
Chapter 3 takes a similar approach but instead looks at markets where busi-
nesses are primarily funded through advertisement. This model reaches similar con-
clusions: there are strong possible efficiency gains from prioritizing some kinds of
traffic, but no policy is likely to have a strong effect on investment and the dangers
of upstream market distortion are considerable. As a result, both chapters suggest
the optimal regulatory policy is one that allows prioritizing types of traffic without
allowing the ISP to pick winners among the content providers.
Chapters 2 and 3 make it clear that the effects of Net Neutrality regulation are
directly tied to the monopoly status of the Internet Service Providers, so in Chapter
4 I examine the market structure in detail to better understand why the market is
still so heavily concentrated. Capital constraints are clearly part of the issue, but
distortions caused by bundling and local regulations appear to play a large role.
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
And Provided further, That messages received from any individual, com-
pany, or corporation, or from any telegraph lines connecting with this
line at either of its termini, shall be impartially transmitted in the order
of their reception, excepting that the dispatches of the government shall
have priority.
–Pacific Telegraph Act of 1860, 36th Congress June, 1860
The question of how to route information on the Internet sounds like a computer
science problem, but the answer has enormous economic implications because it will
have a profound effect on what content people consume and how much they are willing
to pay for it. This in turn will determine investment not only in new content but
also in infrastructure. The incentive to develop new infrastructure seems particularly
important in the US, which has fallen from 1st to 12th in the world in terms of average
connection speed.1 While the FCC weighed in on the issue in December 2010 (See
FCC 10-201), it is far from settled due to ongoing court battles, legislation, and even
an apparent evolution in the FCC’s interpretation of its own rules.
I intend to explore two major issues. In the short run, what kind of prioritization
makes the most efficient use of our existing infrastructure and what kind of incentives
do Internet Service Providers (ISP) have to actually implement that priority? In the
1See Akamai Technologies [2012].
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2long run, how much new infrastructure should we invest in and how does that change
with prioritization?
1.1 Background
Net Neutrality is, in essence, a broad principle that states ISPs should not alter
the quality of service based on the origin or type of traffic. For example, under Net
Neutrality an ISP could not slow down (or prioritize) traffic to video sites in general,
nor to a specific site like Netflix. It does not, however, state that the service should
not be altered based on the person requesting said information. Therefore, even
under Net Neutrality, ISPs are free to offer different levels of service to consumers.
Schuett (2010) summarizes the issue as follows:
One reason why the debate about Net Neutrality is often confusing to
outsiders is that the term is used in connection with several distinct con-
cepts. In essence, Net Neutrality is a theoretical benchmark with which
various practices that depart from it are contrasted. The fact that net-
work operators cannot distinguish between packets means, on the one
hand, that they cannot determine their origin. It follows that they cannot
charge the originator of a packet a fee for transmitting it to users. Thus,
Net Neutrality implies a zero-price rule. On the other hand, the fact that
network operators cannot distinguish between packets means they cannot
discriminate in terms of price or quality of transmission depending on the
3type, the origin, or the destination of a data packet. Operators cannot
engage in traffic management by, e.g., prioritizing traffic, favoring certain
packets over others. Thus, Net Neutrality implies a non-discrimination
rule.
The basic arguments for and against Net Neutrality regulations have been reasonably
well established at this point. Those in favor of such regulations argue that ISPs are
likely to discriminate in favor of their own services and that so-called ’termination
fees’ will stifle innovation and growth among content providers. Such fees might
be particularly troublesome to new businesses because of the sheer complexity of
arranging contracts with dozens of ISPs. Lee and Wu (2009) worry that even if
service providers have a free ’slow lane’ that they will have an incentive to degrade
its quality in order to force content providers to pay.
Those against regulation argue that termination fees would help encourage fu-
ture investment in bandwidth, bandwidth that might be badly needed in the near
future if demand continues to increase. AT&T, for instance, claims that wireless traf-
fic grew 5000% in three years (2006-2009) and in 2010 alone it invested over 23 billion
dollars in wireless and wired networks. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that the
current structure of the Internet really is a level playing field: large companies can
already procure faster access through the backbone and the first-come-first-serve na-
ture of the network may promote congestion-tolerant services like file transfer over
real-time services like voice chat.
4From the perspective of a governing body, there is an entire spectrum of possi-
ble regulation ranging from a strict first-come-first-serve rule (Net Neutrality) to no
regulation whatsoever. Somewhat more moderate voices have proposed a system of
”equal treatment among similar applications” (see Wu (2003)), where discrimination
is allowed as long as it is applied evenly to data of a given type. Finally, the FCC’s
current system requires transparency and forbids foreclosure or ”unreasonable dis-
crimination.”(See FCC 10-201) However, more recent public statements suggest the
FCC is leaning toward a very restrictive interpretation of those rules.
Figure 1.1 shows a very simplified view of the Internet. I focus primarily on
the relationship between the ISP and the consumer, sometimes called the last-mile.
While Net Neutrality potentially has broader implications, most of the current debate
focuses on this sector because the ISP is so often a monopoly.
Fig. 1.1: A greatly simplified view of the Internet
51.2 Key Assumptions
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with content providers using different business models
(subscription-based and advertising-based content respectively), but the models are
similar and share a number of key features and assumptions: 1) a monopoly ISP,
2) no two-sided market, 3) multiplicative utility, 4) one queue priority, and
5) sensitivity and congestion
First, I assume that the ISP is a monopoly. Despite the rather large number of
companies that provide broadband Internet access, each tends to be a monopoly in
its own geographic area. While some areas have more than one provider, this tends
to happen only in the largest, densest cities. Comcast, the largest cable ISP, overlaps
with Verizon’s FiOS in just 15% of its geographic area and even less with other cable
companies. This assumption is critical to the results of the model. If there were to
be serious competition between ISPs, then it would no longer be possible for them
to distort upstream content markets.
Second, I assume that the ISP can not bring new customers into the market
either through investment or lowering its price. While this assumption runs contrary
to a number of other papers on topic, I do not think it is an unrealistic simplification.
On the investment side of things, the FCC reports that there are only 19 million
Americans without access to broadband Internet. As virtually all of these people
are located in very rural areas where the cost of delivery would be extremely high,
the only thing likely to cause expansion there is an FCC mandate. On the price
6side of things, ISPs already heavily engage in screening their customers. While only
about two-thirds of American households currently have broadband, the 2010 census
reports that only 76% of households have a computer and some of the remaining
potential customers have non-broadband access. Essentially, service providers might
be encouraged to increase the quality of service for the people already with access, but
the benefits of that to content providers are likely much smaller than finding entirely
new customers. Altering this assumption is also unlikely to change the outcome of
the model, particularly in the subscription model where there is already a direct
financial connection between content providers and consumers.
It is worth noting that this assumption does not prevent ISPs from investing in
content providers themselves (the other half of the two-sided market.) While a very
literal ”zero-price rule” would, in fact, rule this kind of investment out, even the most
stringent of Net Neutrality proposals contain nothing like this. Indeed, many ISPs
have been investing in new content from the earliest days of dialup.2 Thus, to the
extent that other papers have found that Net Neutrality is welfare-decreasing because
it rules out negative termination fees, I think the authors have simply misunderstood
the situation.
The first two assumptions together create a somewhat unusual monopoly model.
Typically, monopolies are assumed to charge a price above the social optimum, which
results in a suboptimal quantity, but this is not possible when every customer is
2AOL, for instance, has been doing this since at least the mid-1980s.
7served. This model is, instead, really about the ISP providing a substandard quality,
either through underinvesting in the network or prioritizing the wrong content.
Third, I model the cost of waiting for services multiplicatively instead of addi-
tively. This is a substantial deviation from most of the related literature but seems
important because it better represents the way in which people actually react. When
content is slow, rather than simply waiting and waiting for it to load, people often
react by using less of it or accepting a lower quality. Streaming video, for instance,
virtually always offers a menu of possible quality options so that consumers never
have to wait, even if they have very slow connections. This is particularly important
for the chapter on advertising because site visits are directly proportional to revenue.
Fourth, priority service is modeled as moving those packets to the head of a
single queue rather than blocking off part of the connection for just that traffic.3
This distinction is important because, while both priority schemes are technically
possible, ISPs are only considering one of them because the other is inefficient. While
the difference in modeling may seem subtle, the effects are not trivial and drive a
number of results in other papers.
Finally, I explicitly model content in terms of both the bandwidth required and
its sensitivity to congestion. While this is not an entirely new approach, it is quite
3As an analogy, consider an airport security checkpoint with one line for regular passengers
and one line for elite travelers. In some airports the machines serving these two lines are entirely
separate: elite passengers may not wait at all if their line is empty but may end up waiting for
quite a bit if there is a large number of other elite travelers at the same time. In either case, all
elite travelers go through the same screening machine. An alternative that many airports use is to
have two lines but only one set of machines: elite travelers who enter are simply moved ahead of
everyone in the normal line.
8distinct from similar papers by Cheng et al. (2011) and Choi and Kim (2010). This
flexibility is extremely important because, as Figure 1.2 shows, the two factors are
not correlated in any way and they are fundamental to evaluating both the cost and
the benefit of prioritizing a particular kind of content.
Fig. 1.2: Types of Content by Bandwidth β and Sensitivity to Congestion θ
1.3 Related Literature
There are several areas of related literature. The idea of charging for priority
service has been extensively studied in the nonlinear pricing literature, and this paper
comes to similar conclusions about the possibility of gains in efficiency.4 In addition,
the structure of the Internet resembles that of both the telephone and telegraph
4See Wilson (1993), among others.
9networks, and the concept of Net Neutrality there dates back to at least the 1800s.5
Despite the superficial similarities, however, the technology of the Internet raises a
number of issues not seen previously.
The literature directly on topic is relatively thin and many of the conclusions
are either ambiguous or contradictory. Some of the earliest papers on the topic
were extensions of the two-sided market literature (see Rochet and Tirole (2003)
and Armstrong (2006)). This makes sense to the extent that we see the ISP as a
platform that facilitates interaction between consumers and content providers. In
particular, both consumers and content providers generate positive externalities for
the other, so in the optimal outcome the ISP may wish to subsidize one of the two
sides. Economides and Tag (2009) find that in order for Net Neutrality to be the
first-best outcome, content providers need to value additional customers more highly
than customers value additional content providers; otherwise the ISP would not
want to charge content providers at all. Caves (2010) points out that the parameter
restrictions required for this result may not be reasonable, and that under other
circumstances consumers may end up providing a large subsidy to content providers.
Musacchio et al. (2009) examine the possible negative externality effects that
ISPs might have on each other if each is a monopoly only in one region. Since
each ISP captures the full benefit of a fee but the cost of a fragmented Internet is
borne across all ISPs, each may overcharge content providers compared to the social
5See the Pacific Telegraph Act of 1860, 36th Congress June, 1860
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optimum. The authors show that this may indeed be a serious problem depending
on the elasticity of consumer demand and the level of advertising revenue.
More recent papers have grappled directly with the idea that content providers
have varying sensitivities to congestion. Papers by Cheng et al. (2011) and Choi and
Kim (2010) are mathematically most similar to this paper. Both use a Hotelling
model of competition between content providers who subsist entirely on advertising.
Cheng et al. (2011) find that doing away with Net Neutrality can be welfare improving
if and only if a single content provider ends up with priority. Choi and Kim (2010)
do not find a clear relationship between Net Neutrality and social welfare. They both
also assume that consumers’ utility functions are additive and that traffic to a given
content provider is exogenous, restrictions that severely limit the kinds of decisions
consumers might make.
Another paper dealing with congestion by Kra¨mer and Wiewiorra (2012) uses
a continuum of content providers with different sensitivities where, in equilibrium,
only some content providers actually choose to enter the market. They find that
doing away with Net Neutrality unambiguously improves welfare in the short run but
may give very poor long run investment incentives. Their assumptions that content
providers do not compete in any sense and that consumers blindly visit every possible
website a set number of times may cause their model to badly understate the negative
effects of prioritization, however.
11
A new paper by Economides and Hermalin (2012) uses a screening model to
examine how an ISP might want to prioritize a number of different types of content
providers. This paper makes the much more reasonable assumption that consumers
adjust their behavior based on actual transmission speeds. They conclude that in
the short run Net Neutrality is often welfare-maximizing within the restricted set
of outcomes that content providers and ISPs can be incentivized to pursue. In the
long run (when firms can make long-term investments) the results are less clear and
deviations from Net Neutrality may indeed be in the best interest of all parties.
Chapter 2
Subscription-Based Content
Much of the work to date has focused on content providers who profited solely
from advertising. While this simplifying assumption still covers a great number of
areas, a number of interesting cases (e.g. Amazon, Netflix, Skype) charge consumers
directly for goods and services instead. The ability to compete on price seems likely
to have a significant impact on the incentives for all involved.
2.1 A Model of Net Neutrality
Consider a model with three kinds of actors: consumers, a monopoly ISP, and two
competing content providers. The timing in the model is as follows:
1. Content Providers each set a price for accessing their service.
2. The ISP sets a price for Internet access and decides what kind of prioritization
to offer (if any).
3. Consumers decide whether or not to buy Internet access and, if so, which
content provider to subscribe to.
12
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Content providers compete with each other for customers based upon both the price
for their good and the consumer’s preference. CP1 is situated at point 0 on a Hotelling
line and sets a price for consumers p1 while CP2 is situated at point 1 on the line
and sets a price of p2. I assume that both content providers have an identical cost
mc for each additional consumer they serve.1 Since the distance between the content
providers has been arbitrarily set to 1 I assume that the actual transport cost for a
distance of x is ηx. Thus the smaller η the more directly the two firms compete.2
Finally, depending on the kind of content that these two providers create, their service
may be more or less sensitive to congestion. Since these two content providers are
assumed to be in direct competition, however, I assume that they have identical
sensitivity and model it with a single parameter θ. The timing of the model reflects
the fact that content providers are typically national/international in their scope and
thus unlikely to adjust their prices based upon the actions of a regional ISP.
As noted before, I assume that the ISP is the sole provider of Internet access in
its area. In the short run the ISP sets the price a for access. Under Net Neutrality
no contract between the ISP and the content providers is allowed, so this is its only
role. Without a strict Net Neutrality regulation the ISP can decide whether or not
to offer some kind of priority service and what price to charge for it. In the long
1With the creation of services like Amazon’s S3 it’s now possible for even very small content
providers to get servers, bandwidth, etc at prices similar to what very big content providers have.
2For example, two firms like Amazon and Barnes and Noble selling exactly the same book might
have an η very close to zero while two firms like Netflix and Hulu have a substantially higher η
because they offer different TV shows and movies.
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run the ISP also makes an investment in infrastructure which determines the average
wait time for its services w.
Finally, consumers have a number of choices. They may choose to pay the ISPs
price a for Internet access or forgo it entirely. If they purchase Internet access they
receive utility of V
1+w
where V represents their valuation for the Internet and 1+w
represents the value lost due to waiting. This multiplicative structure is unusual
compared to previous papers but I think more accurately describes the cost to con-
sumers: rather than simply costing time, waiting actively reduces the amount of
content someone consumes so the more they value the Internet the more they have
to lose.
In addition, each consumer has an ideal location for content xi along the
Hotelling line and consumers are equally distributed. A customer served by his/her
ideal content would get a surplus of 1
1+θw
where θ represents this service’s sensitiv-
ity to congestion. The transportation cost to available content is η for each unit
of distance away from ideal content. Thus if a consumer has Internet access, given
the Internet conditions (wait time w, sensitivity to congestion θ), the prices set by
the content providers (p1, p2), and the relative strength of the transport cost (η),
consumers may choose to purchase from CP1, CP2, or nothing at all. I assume
the services are sufficient substitutes that no one would not want to purchase both.
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Consumer i’s willingness to pay for CP 1’s and CP 2’s services is respectively
WTP1(xi) =
1− ηxi
1 + θw
WTP2(xi) =
1− η(1− xi)
1 + θw
Again, the multiplicative nature of this structure means that waiting changes not only
the maximum possible utility from content but also the utility consumers actually
get when transportation costs are taken into account.
Consumer xi’s overall utility is
U(xi) = max

0
V
1+w − a
V
1+w − a+ 1−ηxi1+θw − p1
V
1+w − a+ 1−η(1−xi)1+θw − p2
2.1.1 Nash Equilibrium Under Net Neutrality
In order for content providers to actually be competing for customers in the
middle, transportation costs need to be low enough; otherwise, content providers are
best off simply charging monopoly prices and ignoring their competitor.
η ≤ 2
3
(1−mc(1 + θw)) (2.1)
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Similarly V needs to be large enough that the ISP will not want to drive customers
away just to capture more surplus in this market.
V ≥ 1 + w
3
(
1
1 + θw
−mc
)
(2.2)
In practical terms this is less strict than V ≥ 1. Under (2.1) and (2.2) it is possible
to show that the only Nash Equilibrium is for content providers to charge
p1 = p2 =
η
1 + θw
+mc
for the ISP to charge
a =
V
1 + w
+
1− (3/2)η
1 + θw
−mc
and for all consumers to purchase Internet access and service from the closest content
provider.3
Figure 2.1 shows a typical Net Neutrality outcome. The lower area represents
ISP revenue, the middle areas represent content provider revenue, and the upper
triangles represent consumer surplus.
3See Appendix A.1.
17
Fig. 2.1: Nash Equilibrium when V = 5, η = .55, w = .25, mc = .1
2.2 Without Net Neutrality
If Net Neutrality is not enforced, there are several possible ways for ISPs to
consider charging content providers. They might simply set a flat price for priority
access, they might charge a rate per gigabyte of traffic, or they might hold an auction
and sell priority access only to the highest bidder. No matter how the ISP chooses to
implement a charge, there are really only two possible outcomes: either the ISP sets
a price g at which either content provider can purchase priority over other Internet
traffic, or the ISP charges a higher price gM to just one of the content providers for
sole priority access.
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I assume that anyone with priority access has a wait time wp = 0 which is a
reasonable approximation if only a very small percentage of total traffic has priority.
Further let us assume that the wait time for anything that does not have priority is
wnp = βw where β is determined by the overall level of traffic used by the content
providers and is always > 1.
2.2.1 Dual Priority
If both content providers pay for priority access the situation is remarkably
similar to the one with Net Neutrality though consumer preferences shift as in Figure
2.2.
Fig. 2.2: Consumer preferences under Net Neutrality and dual priority
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With the same assumptions as before the unique Nash Equilibrium again has all
consumers purchasing Internet and content from their closest provider.
p1 = p2 = η +mc
and
a =
V
1 + βw
+ 1− (3/2)η −mc
Finally the willingness of content providers to pay for priority is limited by the
additional amount of profit they receive from consumers for having faster service.
Since content providers have identical price, cost, and demand:
g = (1/2)η − (1/2) η
1 + θw
= (1/2)η
θw
1 + θw
2.2.2 Comparing Net Neutrality and Dual Priority
To recap:
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Under NN
x¯ = 1/2
p1 = p2 =
η
1 + θw
+mc
pij = 1/2
η
1 + θw
g = 0
piISP = a =
V
1 + w
+
1− (3/2)η
1 + θw
−mc
CS = 1/4
η
1 + θw
TS =
V
1 + w
−mc+ 1− (
1/4)η
1 + θw
Under DP
x¯ = 1/2
p1 = p2 = η +mc
pij = (1/2)η − g
g = (1/2)η
θw
1 + θw
piISP =
V
1 + βw
+ 1− (3/2)η −mc+ 2g
CS = (1/4)η
TS =
V
1 + βw
−mc+ 1− (1/2)η
Consumers
Despite strictly higher prices for content in the dual priority case, consumers as
a whole are slightly better off because the ISP can not capture 100% of their new
surplus. Recall that waiting reduces the consumer’s actual surplus rather than just
their maximum possible surplus. As a result, reducing the waiting time actually
increases the impact of transportation costs and thus the level of differentiation
among consumers. Since the marginal consumer constrains the ISP from increasing
the price of access any further, this increased differentiation results in more consumer
surplus.
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Content Providers
Content providers split the market equally in both cases. Despite getting to
charge higher prices, the additional price paid for priority to the ISP ensures that
they get exactly the profit they would under single priority.
ISP
piDPISP − piNNISP = V
[
1
1 + βw
− 1
1 + w
]
+ (1− (1/2)η) θw
1 + θw
The ISP’s change in profit is a bit more complicated than the others. Prioritizing
the content providers it makes the rest of the Internet a bit slower, reducing the
benefit to consumers and thus the price the ISP can charge. Thus the first term
of this equation is always negative and depends strongly on the value for the rest
of the Internet V and the amount of traffic the content providers require β. The
second term represents the additional surplus that the ISP can extract from content
providers for providing priority and is always positive. Note that the second term is
decreasing in η, so the more differentiated the firms the less interested the ISP will be
in providing priority. This happens because again higher transportation costs mean
a lower utility for the marginal consumer. The second term is also increasing in θ
and w so the higher the wait time or sensitivity the more the ISP will be interested
in providing priority.
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Social Welfare
TSDP − TSNN = V
[
1
1 + βw
− 1
1 + w
]
+ (1− (1/4)η) θw
1 + θw
This equation looks a great deal like the one for the ISP. Again, the first part will
always be negative and the second part will always be positive. This should make
clear that in markets where θ is high (content providers are highly sensitive to con-
gestion), V is low (the service from content providers is valuable compared to other
uses for the Internet), and/or β is close to 1 (this service uses little traffic), moving
away from Net Neutrality can be socially optimal. (See Figure 2.3.)
Fig. 2.3: Difference in Total Surplus between Net Neutrality and dual priority as V
changes with w = .3, β = 1.05, η = .7 and mc = .1
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In addition note that the benefit to the ISP for moving away from Net Neutrality
is similar but will always be lower than for society as a whole. This is true because
the ISP pays the full social cost in the form of lower payments from consumers but
can not capture 100% of the social benefit from the change because the marginal
consumer limits the consumer surplus that can be extracted. Figure 2.4 shows the θ
required to make dual priority the preferred outcome for a given V for both the ISP
and society as a whole. Above the top line both the ISP and society want a dual
priority scheme, below the bottom line both want Net Neutrality, but for values of
V, θ that fall in between society would prefer dual priority but the ISP does not.
Fig. 2.4: θ required to make dual priority optimal for a given V when w = .5,
β = 1.2, η = 0.5
In summary, it may be both in the ISP’s best interest and socially optimal to
move away from Net Neutrality if the content involved is both sufficiently valuable
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and sensitive to congestion. Because the ISP bears the full social cost of priority but
receives only some of the benefit, however, the ISP’s incentive to switch is always
smaller than the social incentive. Thus the ISP never implements a dual priority
scheme when it is not socially optimal but may fail to implement it when the social
benefit is low.
2.2.3 Single Priority
If only one content provider gets access, without loss of generality let us assume
content provider 1, firms no longer face symmetrical demand. Figure 2.5 shows the
content provider with priority has much higher demand while the content provider
without is actively worse off.
The Nash Equilibrium is no longer symmetric. Given p1 and p2 the indifferent
consumer has xi = x¯ such that
1− ηx¯− p1 = 1− η(1− x¯)
1 + βSθw
− p2
x¯ =
1 + βSθw
2 + βSθw
1
η
[
1 + p2 − p1 + η − 1
1 + βSθw
]
Content providers have profits
pi1 = x¯(p1 −mc) pi2 = (1− x¯)(p2 −mc)
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Fig. 2.5: Consumer preferences under Net Neutrality and single priority
and the first order conditions simplify to
2p1 = 1 + p2 +mc+
η − 1
1 + βSθw
2p2 = mc+ p1 − 1 + η + 1
1 + βSθw
which together give
p1 = mc+ 1/3 +
η + (1/3)ηβSθw − 1/3
1 + βSθw
p2 = mc− 1/3 + η + (2/3)ηβ
Sθw + 1/3
1 + βSθw
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Fig. 2.6: Nash Equilibrium under single priority.
The indifferent consumer is thus
x¯ =
1 + 1+1/η
3
βSθw
2 + βSθw
which is always strictly greater than 1/2 since η < 1. Figure 2.6 shows the Nash
Equilibrium with consumer surplus (yellow), content provider revenue (green) and
ISP revenue (red). The difference between the two green areas will be the price of
prioritization gS.
If the ISP is committed to only selling priority access to one CP, then not buying
priority means allowing your competitor to buy it. Therefore content providers should
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be willing to pay up to the difference in profit between having access and not having
it. The price that makes them exactly indifferent is
gS = x¯S(p1 −mc)− (1− x¯S)(p2 −mc)
piISP =
V
1 + βSw
+ U1(x¯)− p1 + gS
Consumers Surplus is
CS = 1/2(1− U1(x¯))(x¯) + 1/2( 1
1 + βSθw
− U2(x¯))(1− x¯)
Finally Social Welfare is
TS =
V
1 + βSw
+ (1/2)x¯(1 + U1(x¯)) + 1/2(1− x¯)( 1
1 + βSθw
+ U2(x¯))−mc
2.2.4 Comparing Net Neutrality with Prioritization
Consumers strictly prefer some kind of priority system to Net Neutrality but
only because it helps to differentiate them and thus limits the amount of surplus that
the ISP can extract. Content providers are either no better off or actively worse off
under prioritization but again the distinction is somewhat artificial because the ISP
is extracting so much surplus. The most pressing comparisons, therefore, are ISP
profit and social welfare.
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ISP profit
piNN =
V
1 + w
+
1− (1/2)η
1 + θw
−mc
piDP =
V
1 + βw
+ 1− (1/2)η + η θw
1 + θw
−mc
piSP =
V
1 + βSw
+ 1− x¯η − (1− x¯)(p1 + p2)−mc
Since prioritizing some content reduces consumer welfare for other parts of the
Internet, the ISP needs to reduce the price it charges to consumers. Because single
priority involves giving priority to less total traffic this effect is less pronounced than
under dual priority. The latter part of the second and third equation represent the
additional profit to the ISP from selling prioritization. When content providers are
strongly differentiated (η is large) they both charge high prices and as a result the
ISP often makes more money from selling priority to both. When content providers
are not strongly differentiated and competition is fierce, however, the ISP can often
generate a great deal more revenue by offering prioritization to only one firm. This
difference is reflected in Figures 2.7 and 2.8.
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Fig. 2.7: Total revenue from priority when η is relatively large.
Fig. 2.8: Total revenue from priority when η is relatively small.
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Depending on the exact parameters, any one of the outcomes can be profit-
maximizing for the ISP. For given values of w, β, βS, η, and mc the ISP’s typical
preferences are reflected in Figure 2.9. Dual priority is preferred for very high values
of θ (content providers are very sensitive), Net Neutrality is preferred when V is very
large (the current service from content providers is not worth very much), and single
priority is preferred for moderate values of both variables.
Larger values of η (more differentiation between firms) shift the curves toward
each other, reducing the area where the ISP prefers single priority on both sides. A
higher wait time increases the ISP’s interest in both kinds of priority. Finally the
value of β and βS have an enormous impact on the overall outcome because they
directly impact the cost of giving priority.
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Fig. 2.9: The ISP’s preferred outcome by θ and V
2.2.5 Social Welfare
In every case the ISP bears the full cost of giving priority but receives something
other than the social benefit. It is therefore inevitable that the ISP’s best option is
not always in society’s best interest. Using the same values as above Figure 2.10
shows the optimal social outcome.
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Fig. 2.10: Society’s preferred outcome by θ and V
Figure 2.11 shows a comparison between the socially optimal and ISP-preferred
outcomes for a wide variety of θ and V . For every value of η the ISP’s preference for
single priority is always too strong compared to the socially efficient outcome, and
as competition between content providers increases (η falls) the gap becomes larger
and larger.
Finally, Figure 2.12 represents the optimal choices for both the ISP and society
if, as suggested above, the ISP is allowed to offer dual priority service but not allowed
to charge for it. The ISP’s incentive to give priority traffic is now lower than what
society would like, but all parties agree except in borderline cases. As a result this
suggests that a policy allowing prioritization could lead to efficiency gains.
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Fig. 2.11: Preferred outcomes for the ISP and Society
2.3 Long Run Investment Incentives for the ISP
Until now I have focused on the short run where the question was about how
to make the most efficient use of a limited resource (bandwidth). In the long run,
though, the ISP has a choice to make about how much to invest and as a result what
the average wait time will be for services using its network. Suppose then that the
ISP can make a long run investment which sets w by paying c(w) where:
 c(w) > 0 and is everywhere differentiable
 c′(w) < 0 ∀ w since a lower w represents more investment
 lim
w→∞
c′(w) = 0
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Fig. 2.12: Preferred outcomes for the ISP and society when no charge is allowed
 lim
w→0
c′(w) = −∞
2.3.1 Net Neutrality
piNNISP =
V
1 + w
+
1− 3/2η
1 + θw
− c(w)
dpiNNISP
dw
=
−V
(1 + w)2
− θ 1− 3/2η
(1 + θw)2
− c′(w)
−c′(w) = V
(1 + w)2
+ θ
1− 3/2η
(1 + θw)2
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Because a larger w results in a smaller cost, written this way the larger the right
hand side the larger the ISP’s incentive to invest. Note that social surplus is
TSNN =
V
1 + w
+
1− .25η
1 + θw
−mc− c(w)
So the socially optimal level of investment is
−c′(w) = V
(1 + w)2
+ θ
1− .25η
(1 + θw)2
Since θ > 0 and η < 1 the second term is always positive and thus the ISP’s incentive
to invest is too low compared to the social optimum.
2.3.2 Prioritization
Under dual priority:
dpiDPISP
dw
=
−βV
(1 + βw)2
+ (1/2)η
[
θ
1 + θw
− θ
2w
(1 + θw)2
]
− c′(w)
which simplifies a bit to
−c′(w) = V β
(1 + βw)2
− 1/2 ηθ
(1 + θw)2
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Social Surplus is
TSDP =
V
1 + βw
+ 1− (1/4)η −mc− c(w)
So the socially optimal level of investment is
−c′(w) = V β
(1 + βw)2
The first terms are identical so the difference hinges on the second term. Since θ and
η are always positive the second term will again always be negative, so even under
dual priority the ISP’s incentive to invest is too low.
Under single priority the ISP’s investment will be:
−c′(w) = V β
S
(1 + βSw)2
− dx¯
dw
(p1 + p2 − η − 2mc) + (1− x¯)
(
dp1
dw
+
dp2
dw
)
The first term represents the full social cost of giving priority while the second and
third terms represent the change in ISP revenue from altering the wait time. Because
dx¯
dw
> 0 the second term will always be negative and represents the loss of revenue from
content providers. Essentially, as w decreases priority service becomes less valuable
to content providers. Finally the third term is positive for reasonable parameter
values and represents the increased prices content providers can charge for better
service. The second and third terms are relevant to the ISP’s investment decision
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because the charge for single priority is based on the difference in profit for the two
content providers.
2.3.3 Overall Long Run Investment Incentives
Fig. 2.13: ISP’s optimal investment in wait times (w) as a function of θ. Higher wait
times indicate lower investment.
Figure 2.13 shows the ISP’s optimal choice of the wait time w for each of the different
priority options as θ changes. Since a lower wait time indicates more investment, it is
clear that both prioritization options result in substantially less investment than Net
Neutrality. This may seem surprising given that a core argument against regulation
is that ISPs would use the additional funds to invest more in their networks. Part of
the reason for the reduced investment is that higher wait times make priority service
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more attractive so by reducing investment the ISP can increase fees from content
providers.
Fig. 2.14: The difference between the ISP’s chosen w and society’s optimal w.
Positive values represent too little investment compared to the social optimum.
Another reason for the lower level of investment under priority is that the ISP is
simply making better use of its’ existing infrastructure. Figure 2.14 shows the ISP’s
optimal level of investment relative to the social optimum for each of the possible
prioritization schemes. As I noted above, Net Neutrality does not give ISPs enough
of an incentive to invest in their networks. While neither dual priority nor single
priority appear to solve the issue entirely, both prioritization schemes can lead to
substantially better results, especially for congestion-sensitive traffic where they are
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likely to be employed. Thus while the absolute level of investment may be lower,
prioritization can result in an outcome much closer to the social optimum.
2.4 Conclusion
Allowing Internet service providers to move away from Net Neutrality has the
potential to be socially beneficial by shielding high-value/low-bandwidth traffic from
congestion. There is no question that the strict Net Neutrality approach precludes
us from making the most efficient use of our infrastructure, so it would only seem
justified if it were the least bad option. It is also clear that the no regulation approach
is untenable because while it does give the ISPs an incentive to make more efficient
use of bandwidth, it also gives them enormous incentives to distort the upstream
market for content. Because the ISP has so much influence the fees it can plausibly
extract from content providers are quite large and would likely substantially reduce
the incentive for new kinds of content on the Internet. Furthermore I can find no
support for the argument that ISPs will make up for it by investing more in their
infrastructure.
The two more moderate approaches to regulation are much more interesting.
Allowing Internet service providers to charge for prioritization but requiring them
to sell it at a consistent price to any interested content provider might reduce the
incentive to distort content markets. This, however, is likely to create a substantial
enforcement challenge because so many service providers are vertically integrated. In
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addition, while the cost of prioritization is likely to be lower than under no regulation,
it will still be substantial and thus decrease the incentive to create new content. Thus
the most promising approach is allowing prioritization for different kinds of traffic
but prohibiting service providers from charging for it. Despite the zero-price regula-
tion for priority, ISPs would still have a substantial incentive to prioritize high-value
traffic because the beneficial effects for consumers allow a higher price for Internet ac-
cess. While the result may give service providers too little an incentive to implement
priority, it captures a substantial portion of the benefits without the serious market
distortions or reductions in content investment. Vertical integration still presents
some serious regulatory challenges, but unlike trying to monitor the internal pay-
ments of a firm, the FCC and a number of consumer groups have already created a
number of tests to ensure that service providers are technologically compliant.
Chapter 3
Advertising-Based Content
In the last chapter I primarily examined businesses that directly charged con-
sumers for goods and services, essentially everything from streaming video to online
shopping. A key characteristic of that market is the direct financial connection be-
tween consumers and content providers. Not only can content providers compete
with each other on price, but they can also lower their prices in order to draw new
customers into the market.
In this chapter I want to instead consider businesses that primarily earn rev-
enue through advertising. Companies like Google and Yahoo are the most obvious
examples, but many much smaller websites rely on exactly the same thing. In many
ways these content providers have a great deal less flexibility: they can no longer
compete directly on price, so the competition between them is limited to things like
service improvements and advertising. One might imagine that in a context like this
the companies involved should respond by trying to differentiate their services as
much as possible. The reality, however, is that websites seem to race to be more
like each other rather than less. For example when Microsoft launched a new search
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engine Bing to compete with Google, it was very similar all the way down to the
simple aesthetic of the home page. New innovations are always underway, of course,
but because web pages can be changed so quickly the first mover advantage is often
extremely limited.
As in the previous chapter, I want to study both the optimal decisions of the
ISP in the short run as well as the incentive to make long run investments. The
conclusions here are broadly similar: moving away from Net Neutrality and toward
prioritization can have short run efficiency benefits but is unlikely to have significant
beneficial effects on investment in the long run.
3.1 The Model
Consider again a simple model of the Internet where there are only three kinds
of actors: consumers, content providers, and a monopoly ISP.
3.1.1 Content Providers
There are two content providers (CP1 and CP2) who directly compete for busi-
ness. Different kinds of content can require vastly different levels of bandwidth, but
two content providers offering identical services are not likely to differ very much
so we can model this with a single parameter β > 1. Similarly, different types of
content on the Internet have different sensitivities to traffic congestion. Services that
are mostly text-based (like reference materials) are likely to be congestion-insensitive
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due to their low traffic requirement and lack of real time interaction, whereas video-
on-demand (which requires both a large volume of traffic and a constant stream of
data) may be very sensitive. This kind of sensitivity is modeled as the parameter
θ ∈ [0, inf).
Each content provider earns revenue solely from advertising. Content provider
j has revenue per unit of traffic rj, traffic of δjand thus revenue of rjδj. Content
providers need not be equally adept at monetizing traffic, but without loss of gener-
ality assume r1 ≥ r2.
3.1.2 The ISP
In the long run, the ISP chooses the amount to invest in its bandwidth which
in turn sets the average wait time w ≥ 0 that consumers face. The cost of a given
level of wait time is c(w). In the short run the ISP sets the price consumers pay for
Internet access a ≥ 0 and the price for priority service g ≥ 0 when applicable.
If D(a, w, θ) is the number of customers who choose to purchase Internet access
given the price, wait time, and the content providers sensitivity to congestion, the
firms long run profits are equal to
pi(a, w, θ) = aD(a, w, θ)− c(w)
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3.1.3 Consumers
Consumers virtually everywhere in the United States pay for Internet access
in a buffet model: for one low monthly price they can use as much or as little as
they would like. I assume that if they buy access consumers use the Internet for any
number of things other than the two content providers in the model and all receive
utility V/(1 + w).
Each consumer stands to gain additional utility from the new service depend-
ing on their preference between content providers. Assume a mass 1 of consumers
evenly distributed on a Hotelling line where each consumer’s position is given by xi.
Consumers closer to a given content provider not only enjoy greater utility for each
visit but actually visit that content provider more often. In particular, given the
wait time w and the content providers’ sensitivity to congestion θ, consumer i has
marginal utility MU1(n, x1) = 1 − n1+θw1−xi if they choose the first content provider
and MU2(n, x1) = 1− n1+θwxi if they choose the second content provider.
Since content providers do not charge consumers directly MC(n) = 0 and con-
sumers keep going to the website until MU(n) = 0. Traffic from consumer i is thus
1− xi
1 + θw
or
xi
1 + θw
depending on which content provider they pick.
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3.1.4 Timing
1: The ISP makes a long-term investment decision in bandwidth which determines
the average wait time for services w.
2: The ISP sets the price for Internet access(a) and, if applicable, the price to be
charged for priority access.
3: If applicable, Content Providers decide whether or not to purchase priority
4: Consumers decide whether or not to purchase Internet access and if so how
much of the new services to consume.
3.2 Model Outcomes in the Short Run
3.2.1 Under Net Neutrality
Consumers who purchase Internet access get to choose between getting
U1(xi) =
1− xi
1 + θw
or U2(xi) =
xi
1 + θw
The worst off consumer is the one who is exactly indifferent xi = 0.5. Thus as long
as the ISP’s price is below the median consumer’s willingness to pay, all consumers
will purchase Internet access.
piISP = a =
V
1 + w
+
.5
1 + θw
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While it might in principle be advantageous for the ISP to raise the price above
this level and exclude some customers, this is never the case for V ≥ 0.1 At this
price all consumers purchase Internet access and opt for one of the content providers.
Consumer Surplus is
CSN =
V
1 + w
+
∫ 0.5
0
1− xi
1 + θw
dxi +
∫ 1
0.5
xi
1 + θw
dxi − a = 1/4
1 + θw
Content providers have traffic
δN1 = δ
N
2 =
∫ 0.5
0
1− xi
1 + θw
dxi =
3/8
1 + θw
and profit
pij = rj
3/8
1 + θw
Finally Total Surplus is
TSN =
V
1 + w
+
3/8
1 + θw
(r1 + r2 + 2)
3.2.2 Without Net Neutrality
As in the previous chapter, there are really only two kinds of deviations from
Net Neutrality that are of interest. First, the ISP might simply set a price for
1See Appendix B.2.
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priority access and give priority to any content provider willing to pay. Second, the
ISP might hold an auction between content providers, providing priority only to the
highest bidder.
To simplify things, assume that the wait time for priority traffic is 0 and that
if someone has priority the wait time for all non-priority traffic is βw where w is
the wait time with no priority at all and β is a measure of the amount of traffic the
content providers use.2
Dual Priority
If both content providers get priority, the indifferent consumer will again be
xi = 0.5. Consumers will demand 1 − xi or xi depending on content provider,
content providers will have traffic δD1 = δ
D
2 = 3/8 and thus profits
piDj = (3/8)rj − g
where g is the price the ISP is charging for priority. Content Providers would be
willing to pay up to the amount of extra revenue they get from priority which is
equal to
rjδ
D
j − rjδNj = rj(3/8)
θw
1 + θw
2See Appendix B.1 for more information on modeling wait times
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since the ISP has full control over access to these customers I assume that the price
set is equal to exactly the willingness to pay of the weaker content provider.3 That
is
g = r2(3/8)
θw
1 + θw
The ISP is once again best off serving all customers and charging a = V
1+βw
+ 1
2
and
thus has a profit of
piDISP =
V
1 + βw
+
1
2
+ 2g =
V
1 + βw
+
1
2
+ (3/4)r2
θw
1 + θw
Consumer surplus is CSD = 1/4, and Total Surplus is
TSD =
V
1 + βw
+
3
8
(r1 + r2 + 2)
Single Priority
If only one content provider gets priority the indifferent consumer is no longer
xi = 0.5. The indifferent consumer has xi = x¯ where
0.5(1− x¯) = 0.5 x¯
1 + θβSw
=⇒ x¯ = 1 + θβ
Sw
2 + θβSw
3This may actually understate the ability of the ISP to extract surplus from content providers in
this scenario. Once a content provider has purchased priority its’ competitor can no longer choose
the Net Neutrality outcome – failure to follow suit buying priority means being the only content
provider without!
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Note that the penalty for non-priority traffic in this case (βS) is not identical to the
penalty in the dual priority case (β) because we’re giving a different amount of traffic
priority. In general 1 < βS ≤ β.4 From here we can calculate the traffic for each
content provider as
δS1 =
∫ x¯
0
(1− x¯)dxi = x¯− .5(x¯)2
δS2 =
∫ 1
x¯
x¯
1 + θβSw
dxi =
1− (x¯)2
2(1 + θβSw)
Again, each content provider would be willing to pay the difference in revenue be-
tween having priority and not. Here, though, not buying priority almost surely means
allowing your competitor to have it so each content provider would be willing to pay
rjδ
S
1 − rjδS2
Again, since by assumption r1 ≥ r2 a second price auction will produce gS =
r2
[
δS1 − δS2
]
The ISP’s optimal price again reflects the utility of the median con-
sumer
piSISP =
V
1 + βSw
+ 1− x¯+ r2
[
δS1 − δS2
]
Consumer surplus is
CSS =
∫ x¯
0
(1− xi)dxi +
∫ 1
x¯
xi
1 + βSw
dxi = δ
S
1 + δ
S
2
4Specifically it would make sense to set βS = 1 + x¯S(β− 1) but this introduces a nasty feedback
loop into the model that typically only changes either value by thousandths of a percent.
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3.3 Analysis
3.3.1 Comparing Net Neutrality with Dual Priority
Under NN
pij =
(3/8)rj
1 + θw
g = 0
piISP =
V
1 + w
+
1/2
1 + θw
CS =
1/4
1 + θw
TS =
V
1 + w
+
3/8
1 + θw
(r1 + r2 + 2)
Under DP
pij = (3/8)rj − g
g = (3/8)r2
θw
1 + θw
piISP =
V
1 + βw
+ 1/2 + 2g
CS =
1
4
TS =
V
1 + βw
+ 3/8(r1 + r2 + 2)
The table above reproduces the key results from the Net Neutrality and dual
priority outcomes. The ISP may or may not be better off under dual priority de-
pending on the value of a number of parameters. If β is large (the cost of priority
is very high) the ISP is less likely to prefer Net Neutrality, while if r2, θ, and w
are large (content provider revenue, sensitivity to congestion, and system wait time
respectively) then the ISP is likely to prefer dual priority.
Content provider 2 is, by design, exactly as well off in each situation. If content
provider 1 has higher revenue per unit of traffic then content provider 1 may always
prefer dual priority even if the content is not particularly sensitive to congestion.
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Consumers are strictly better off under dual priority, but simply because they become
less homogeneous and are therefore less exploitable by the ISP.
The difference in total surplus is a better measure of the social outcome and
looks a great deal like the difference in ISP profits. As in the previous chapter,
however, the ISP’s incentive to implement dual priority is always too low compared
to the social optimum. That is: the ISP only implements dual priority when it is
in society’s best interest but may sometimes fail to implement it in cases where it is
only marginally socially optimal.5
3.3.2 Finding the ISP’s Preferred Outcome
piNNISP =
V
1 + w
+
1− 1/2
1 + θw
piDPISP =
V
1 + βw
+ 1− 1/2 + r2 (
3/4)θw
1 + θw
piSPISP =
V
1 + βSw
+ 1− x¯+ r2(δS1 − δS2 )
Figure 3.1 shows the ISP’s preferred outcome for a variety of possible values of
V and θ. Larger values of V and the smaller values of θ (congestion sensitivity) make
it more likely that the ISP will prefer Net Neutrality over some kind of prioritization.
As in Chapter 1, there exist a moderate set of values values of V and θ for which the
ISP prefers single priority over the other possibilities.
5See Appendix B.3.
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Fig. 3.1: The ISP’s preferred outcome with V increasing on the x-axis and θ decreas-
ing on the y-axis. Green represents a choice of Net Neutrality, yellow represents dual
priority, and red represents single priority.
3.3.3 Finding the Socially Optimal Outcome
TSNN =
V
1 + w
+
3/8
1 + θw
(r1 + r2 + 2)
TSDP =
V
1 + βw
+ 3/8(r1 + r2 + 2)
TSSP =
V
1 + βSw
+ δS1 (1 + r1) + δ
S
2 (1 + r2)
Figure 3.2 is similar to the one above but shows the socially optimal outcome.
The set of parameters for which no priority is preferred to some kind of priority is
almost identical, the major difference is that society often prefers dual priority in a
number of situations where the ISP would have chosen single priority.
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Fig. 3.2: Society’s preferred outcome with V increasing on the x-axis and θ decreasing
on the y-axis. Green represents a choice of Net Neutrality, yellow represents dual
priority, and red represents single priority.
3.3.4 Without Single Priority
An alternative to strict Net Neutrality regulation would allow ISPs to offer
priority service but only if they offered it to any content provider at a consistent
price per gigabyte. In the language of this paper, that effectively allows them to
offer dual priority but not single priority. As we can see in Figure 3.3, from the ISP’s
perspective, much of what was single priority before reverts to Net Neutrality, even
though society typically prefers to move to dual priority.6 From a policy perspective,
this does a nice job of curbing any anti-competitive effects while still retaining most
of the possible efficiency benefits from prioritization. Furthermore, all of the cases
6This is a nice illustration of the result in Appendix B.3.
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where the ISP does not choose the socially optimal are edge cases where the two are
almost equal and in every case it errs on the side of Net Neutrality.
Fig. 3.3: Preferred Outcomes for the ISP (left) and Society (right) when single
priority is not allowed.
3.4 Investment in the Long Run
In the long run, the ISP has a choice to make about how much to invest and as a
result what the average wait time will be for services using its network. Suppose then
that the ISP can make a long run investment which sets w by paying c(w) where:
 c(w) > 0 and is everywhere differentiable
 c′(w) < 0 ∀ w since a lower w represents more investment
 lim
w→∞
c′(w) = 0
 lim
w→0
c′(w) = −∞
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Subtracting that from both the ISP’s profits and the total surplus and finding
the first order conditions gives us the following:
dpiNNISP
dw
= − V
(1 + w)2
− (
1/2)θ
(1 + θw)2
− c′(w)
dpiDPISP
dw
= − βV
(1 + βw)2
+ r2(3/4)
[
θ
1 + θw
− θ
2w
(1 + θw)2
]
− c′(w)
dpiSPISP
dw
= − β
SV
(1 + βSw)2
− dx¯
dw
+ r2
[
dδS1
dw
− dδ
S
2
dw
]
− c′(w)
dTSNN
dw
= − V
1 + w
− (
3/8)θ
(1 + θw)2
(r1 + r2 + 2)− c′(w)
dTSDP
dw
= − βV
(1 + βw)2
− c′(w)
dTSSP
dw
= − β
SV
(1 + βSw)2
+
dδS1
dw
(1 + r1) +
dδS2
dw
(1 + r2)− c′(w)
3.4.1 Optimal Investment for the ISP
Figure 3.4 shows the ISP’s optimal wait time w as the content providers’ sensi-
tivity to congestion changes.7 Several things stand out here. First, investment under
either kind of prioritization is significantly below investment under Net Neutrality
at every level of sensitivity where it might be employed. This result is similar to the
one from Chapter 1 and is again because increased investment significantly decreases
the ability of the ISP to charge for priority service. What is somewhat surprising
here is that investment under single priority can exceed investment under dual prior-
ity. This is different from the result in chapter one and is mainly driven by the fact
7The graph was constructed with V = 10, β = 1.1, βS = 1.05, r1 = r2 = 1 and c(w) = .1/w
2
but is quite robust to other parameter values.
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that content providers now earn revenue from the total volume of traffic they receive
rather than just the number of customers they have.
Fig. 3.4: Optimal Investment for the ISP
3.4.2 Socially Efficient Investment
Figure 3.5 shows the difference in wait times between what is optimal for the
ISP and what is optimal for society. Thus larger numbers represent greater ISP
”underinvestment”. As in Chapter 1, the ISP tends to underinvest not only under
Net Neutrality but also under single priority. Unlike Chapter 1, however, dual priority
does not result in significantly better levels of investment: in fact, prioritization only
leads to more socially optimal investment in the most extreme cases. The difference
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is largely attributable to the additional power that the ISP has over content providers
in this model: the ability to extract additional surplus only increases the incentive
to degrade the non-priority service.
Fig. 3.5: Socially Efficient Investment
3.4.3 Long run Incentives for Content Providers
In the short run, prioritization may not be bad for content providers: under
dual priority, at least, they are not any worse off than under Net Neutrality.8 Under
single priority, and in the long term, however, content providers will suffer both
from the high fees charged for priority service and from the decreased investment in
8The assumption above about pricing under dual priority is actually somewhat weak, the ISP
might be able to extract a larger surplus since if a content provider deviates from Nash Equilibrium
under dual priority they actually end up on the losing side of single priority.
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infrastructure. Both of these outcomes decrease profits and, in turn, decrease the
incentive to create new content.
It is worth noting that content providers generate both positive and negative
externalities. In particular, because consumers pay a flat fee for Internet access and
not an incremental fee for the amount of bandwidth they use, content providers do
not actually pay for the negative effects of using a great deal of bandwidth and are
thus likely to use too much. This suggests that the current incentive to invest in
new content might actually be too high from a social point of view, so an overall
reduction might bring us closer to the first best.
3.5 Conclusion
We can now return to the original question posed at the beginning: ”What
would the Internet look like in the absence of Net Neutrality regulations?” As there
are hundreds if not thousands of different types of content areas on the web, each
with a slightly different value, bandwidth requirement, and sensitivity to congestion,
the ISP can likely find a content providers to match any reasonable (V, β, θ). Given
the wide space of parameters under which the ISP prefers something other than
Net Neutrality, at least some of the available bandwidth will likely be cordoned off
for high priority usage. In almost all of these cases the change will increase overall
social welfare by improving speed and reliability for those services that need it most.
In some instances the ISP may have an incentive to distort the market toward one
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of the content providers (particularly if it’s already vertically integrated with that
content provider). This outcome should be of particular regulatory concern because it
appears to have a strong negative effect on content providers and consumers without
providing any additional incentive for infrastructure investment. This is not exactly
the apocalyptic outcome that some proponents of Net Neutrality describe, though
the biggest difference is in the scale of prioritization. Not every service on the Internet
is worth prioritizing, and it is definitely not in the ISP’s self interest to end up with
a badly fragmented or monopolized Internet.
In the long run, the ability to charge for priority access may not have a dramatic
impact on the incentive for ISPs to invest in their bandwidth capacity. Moving away
from Net Neutrality is unlikely to have a strong effect on investment incentives, and
those services that are the most bandwidth intensive are the least likely to be worth
prioritizing and as a result have the smallest effect on the long-run. Assuming that
new services on the Internet continue the trend of being more and more bandwidth-
intensive, moving away from Net Neutrality will soften the effect on high priority
services in the short run but may result in a lower overall level of investment in the
long run precisely because those high-value services continue to work well even in
the absence of sufficient overall bandwidth. The effect on content providers is almost
surely negative, reducing the incentive to invest and possibly driving some with high
fixed costs out of business entirely.
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Finally, despite the change in business models between this chapter and the
last, both suggest very similar policy prescriptions: a cautious move away from Net
Neutrality is likely to be beneficial in terms of efficiency even if it is unlikely to have
much of an impact on infrastructure. In addition, worries about the incentive for
monopoly service providers to create upstream market distortions seem well founded,
so policies which restrict that behavior seem fully justified.
Chapter 4
Competition in Wired Broadband
A key characteristic of broadband Internet providers in the US is that, despite
the rather large number of companies involved, providers are virtually all either
local monopolies or duopolies.1 As we have seen in the previous two chapters, this
market structure has some undesirable outcomes both with respect to issues like Net
Neutrality but also for even more basic issues like customer service.2 This lack of
competition is, in many ways, surprising. For one thing, Internet access is not really a
natural monopoly like cable television. More users means more bandwidth consumed
and nontrivial increase in costs. Second, the calculations in Section 4.2 suggests that
entry in this market should be profitable, even with very modest takeup rates. The
question of why we do not see more expansion by current providers or entry, then,
seems a pertinent one. In this chapter I explore a number of possible explanations
from barriers to entry to screening and bundling to collusion.
1Some very lucky people have access to three options but they are far and away the exception to
the rule. A number of slower substitutes exist, of course, but given the speed at which technology
is evolving they will be virtually obsolete in a few years.
2Virtually every major cable company regularly shows up in customer surveys of the top 15 most
hated companies in America.
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One complication in talking about broadband Internet access is that there is no
single accepted standard. In the last decade the FCC has changed its’ own definition
from 200 kbps to 768 kbps to 4 Mbps and is apparently considering changing it yet
again this year. In many ways this is understandable: the essence of the term is
that the connection should be fast compared to the data that consumers require, but
the technology involved is constantly evolving to be both faster and more bandwidth
intensive. Older technologies like dialup clearly fail to meet anyone’s definition, but
currently most people no longer consider DSL or satellite connections3 to qualify
either despite the fact that those technologies are capable of speeds over the 4 Mbps
standard. Going forward it seems clear that the main sources of broadband connec-
tions will be cable lines, fiber optic lines, and to a lesser extent wireless, though the
newest generation of satellite technology still shows some promise.
4.1 Empirical Information
The FCC has devoted a great deal of money and effort over the last few years
attempting to gather data about broadband Internet access in the United States.
As of August of 2012 the FCC reports that all but 19 million Americans (6˜% of the
population) can purchase broadband (either at home or at work), though in some
rural areas only about 75% of the population has access. In addition almost 200
3Due to the sheer distance of transmission required to go from earth to a satellite and back,
satellite Internet typically displays very high latency. The FCC’s 2013 Broadband Performance
Report tests put the average satellite connection at 20 times the latency of the average cable
connection.
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million Americans actually have broadband Internet, or just less than 2/3.4 The
FCC concludes from this that while large strides have been made in recent years,
”[b]ecause millions still lack access to or have not adopted broadband... broadband is
not yet being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion.” Unfortunately the FCC
does not have any information about what percentage of people have access to more
than one broadband option.
The largest ISP in the United States is Comcast which had 17 million broadband
Internet customers last year representing roughly 45% of the cable market and 24% of
the total broadband market. It reported roughly $7.6 billion in revenue from Internet
connections, though due to aggressive bundling this figure is very hard to interpret.
4.2 Costs of Expansion and/or Entry
In order for there to be a lack of competition, entry needs to be profitable. As it
seems extremely unlikely that cable companies will expand geographically, increased
competition will have to come either from new investment by existing competitors
(Verizon, AT&T, CenturyLink), from wireless, or from totally new entry.
4.2.1 FiOS
Verizon’s FiOS comes to mind as the most immediate competitor to cable based
on both the the quality of product and the millions of current customers. In addition,
4Again, the survey asks about access either at home or at work, so only some subset of this
population has access at home.
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it seems likely that Verizon has a cost advantage over new entrants due to synergies
with the wireless business and existing contracts for television bundling.5 Neverthe-
less, it seems clear that Verizon is extremely unlikely to pursue additional expansion
of its FiOS network in the near future. Not only has the company publicly ruled out
further expansion in public statements, it has begun selling off parts of the business.
In fact, Verizon even has deals to sell cable Internet access on behalf of Comcast and
Time Warner Cable in markets that do not currently have FiOS, something which
only decreases their incentive to expand.
4.2.2 New Entry
The issue for new companies entering the market with fiber is more complicated,
although it should be noted that a limited amount this is already occurring. The
most famous example is Google in Kansas City,6 but other cities like Seattle and
Chicago have been exploring public/private partnerships to do the same thing.
There is a reasonably robust literature attempting to estimate the cost of de-
ploying Fiber to the Home (FTTH) networks. In Europe, recent work by Hoernig
et al. (2012) and Analysys Mason (2008) suggest that there is room for 3-4 competi-
tors in an area, but because regulation is so different there it is not clear that the
results are directly applicable here.
5See Section 4.6.1.
6Several days before publication Google announced an expansion of their fiber project to Austin
Texas for 2014. If anything, this is further proof that the project is likely to be profitable on its
own rather than simply a very expensive demonstration.
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In order to estimate the initial investment, we need to distinguish between areas
based upon their relative density. Urban areas in the US account for about 3% of
land but almost 80% of the population. For these areas, recent studies by CSMG
in 2009 and Goldman Sachs in 2012 put the cost of passing fiber by a household
between $500 and $700 per household. From there they estimate that the cost of
actually hooking up a particular subscriber is between $400 and $650, although
Google recently publicly gave a cost of just $300. For suburban and rural areas, the
cost to pass fiber by a household is likely much higher because of the lower population
density. CSMG estimates that an additional 10% of households could be passed by
at an average increased cost of 70% with no increase to the cost to hook up individual
subscribers. All of the studies involved agree that these costs seem to be dropping
6-10% per year.
Estimating the monthly cost of a consumer to ISPs is trickier because there
is much less data available. In 2012 networking company Sandvine estimated that
the median broadband subscriber used slightly less than 17 gigabytes per month,
and that the cost to ISPs per gigabyte consumed was between 3 and 6 cents. By
that reasoning, the median consumer had a marginal cost of service between six
and twelve dollars per year. Of course very high speed Internet access is likely to
encourage consumers to use a great deal more, but at the same time the cost per
gigabyte continues to fall.
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On the revenue side, the FCC estimates that in 2012 the average yearly cost
for a 10Mbps connection was around $500. The degree to which consumers would
be willing to pay more for superior speed has not been extensively studied, though
in Kansas City Google is charging $840 per year and appears to have little trouble
getting generating sufficient interest.
Assuming, then, that new entrants can net $800 per year per customer that
actually purchases Internet access, if the cost of passing by a household is p, the cost
of connecting a household is h, and the number of years to break even is y, then the
required takeup rate to break even is −p+ x[−h+ 800y] = 0 or
x =
p
800y − h
In order to break even in 7 years, this suggests that an entrant needs a takeup rate
between 9-13% in urban environments and 16-23% in more rural areas depending on
which end of the costs we use. On a more strict 5 year timetable these increase to
13-20% in urban areas and 23-34% in rural areas. The fiber is likely good for at least
10 years, though, so this suggests that even relatively modest takeup rates would
support new fiber in all but the most isolated areas.
4.2.3 VDSL
An alternative potential source of competition is Very high bit Digital Sub-
scriber Lines (VDSL/VDSL2). This technology is a hybrid between new fiber lines
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and traditional copper wires which typically works by running fiber to a hub near
consumers and then finishing the connection on copper.7 While older generations
of this technology rarely surpassed 30 Mbps in practice, technological advances like
vectoring may extend that to the 100 Mbps range. Because this technology is still
10 times slower than new fiber deployments and does not have the same virtually
unlimited bandwidth in the future, it is not really a viable long term strategy. While
about half the investment can be reused for later FTTH investment,8 technological
changes in this area also substantially increase the risk that the hardware will be out-
dated before it has fully paid for itself. Despite the fact that they have been ramping
up investment, the potential providers in the Untied States (primarily AT&T and
CenturyLink) only offer the newer and faster VDSL2 in a very small subset of cities
and only at the 40 Mbps level.
Analysys Mason (2008) estimates that the cost of VDSL2 is roughly a fifth the
cost of the cheapest Fiber to the Home networks for a given area. Using the same
formula as above but assuming that the companies have to charge a lower price for
the service and may only get 4-5 years out of it, this gives us a minimum takeup rate
in the 10-25% range.
7This is sometimes called Fiber to the Cabinet (FTTC) or Fiber to the Node (FTTN) in the
related literature depending on exactly how close the fiber gets.
8See Analysys Mason (2008).
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4.2.4 Wireless
The last competitor to cable and new fiber entry is broadband wireless. In-
vestment in this sector has been exceptionally large over the last decade. AT&T,
for instance, claims that wireless traffic on their network grew 5000% between 2006
and 2009. While both investment and technological innovation in this space remain
exceptionally high, however, it is not at all clear that wireless has the potential to
meet the rapidly increasing demand for more bandwidth in the home. A connection
is a function not only of its potential speed to a single customer but also its potential
throughput to all customers simultaneously. Even if technological advances manage
to increase the potential burst speed to keep up with wired connections, it seems
increasingly unlikely that the finite wireless spectrum can manage to accommodate
all of the potential users. As a result, while wireless is likely to remain very valuable,
it does not really seem like a real substitute for wired connections in the home.
4.2.5 Conclusion
Based on the calculations above, both VDSL and FTTH entry into the market
ought to be profitable since the required takeup rates are below what both Verizon
and Google have managed to achieve. While we see some entry in these markets,
particularly in midsize cities, they ought to be worthwhile investments all the way
out to at least 90% of the population. As costs continue to fall, or if adoption rates
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are higher than predicted, an even larger proportion of the population may prove a
worthwhile investment, and we have not seen investment on this scale.
4.3 The Problem of Buffet Access
A complicating factor is the fact that consumers pay for unlimited9 monthly
access rather than per gigabyte as is common in the wireless sector. Sandvine’s 2012
”Global Internet Phenomena Report” estimates that the top 1% of users consume
roughly 12.8% of traffic and that the top 10% of users account for about 50% of
the total traffic.10 In addition the report gives the median traffic per broadband
subscriber at 16.8 gigabytes/month (up 190% year over year) and the mean traffic
per subscriber as 51 gigabytes/month (up 122% year over year).
This introduces a number of complications. First, because a number of high-
bandwidth services automatically detect the quality of a connection and use as much
bandwidth as is available, it provides a disincentive for service providers to upgrade
their networks for fear that consumers will simply ratchet up their use of high-
bandwidth-low-value services, perhaps even without noticing.11 A related issue is
that because neither consumers nor content providers pay the full marginal cost of
9Most services do, in fact, put some kind of upper limit on usage, but it is typically so high that
the overwhelming majority of consumers never get anywhere near it.
10Traffic listed is downstream (i.e. traveling into consumers’ homes) rather than upstream.
11Estimates put streaming video at about 40% of bandwidth in the US with streaming content
generally at 65% and file sharing at another 10-15% All of these services will use as much traffic as
they can.
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bandwidth there is likely too much used by consumers and too little investment in
bandwidth reduction by content providers compared to the first best.
Second, this introduces a nasty adverse selection issue for any new entrant
providing Internet access. At this point the cost of laying new infrastructure is
overwhelmingly labor and compliance with regulations rather than material, so it
makes no sense to make major investments in anything other than the newest fiber
optic technology. The customers most likely to value higher speed access, however,
are likely to be the ones who use the most bandwidth. According to the Sandvine
numbers above, the top 1% of users left to their own devices are consuming upwards
of 650 gigabytes per month. Even at the very low end of the cost estimates and
assuming that sudden access to a much faster connection would not change behavior
at all, these users are still generating bandwidth costs over $200 per year.’
It might be possible for a new entrant to change this, of course, but there
seems to be enormous social pressure not to. Time Warner cable, for instance, has
tried repeatedly to introduce two part tariff pricing structures (in markets with zero
competition, no less) but has had to shut the programs down in short order due
to widespread protests. My suspicion is that after years of extremely high markups,
consumers simply view any change as an attempt to extract more surplus, even when
the new plans are completely optional.
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4.4 Net Neutrality and Open Bitstream Access
As we have seen in previous chapters, the eventual outcome of the Net Neutrality
debate is unlikely to have a large effect on the total investment in infrastructure,
particularly in the wired space. Contrary to arguments offered by a number of
service providers, the additional revenue from content providers may not offer an
additional incentive to invest if that investment would undercut the ability of the
firm to charge for priority service.
The topic of open bitstream access is more controversial. Unlike copper tele-
phone wires, US Internet providers are under no obligation to open their networks to
their competitors. In 2005 the FCC effectively gutted provisions in the 1996 telecom-
munications act that would have required in required unbundling (a weaker version of
these rules) in hopes of spurring additional investment in the sector. Unfortunately,
despite this policy, investment in US Internet infrastructure has lagged badly behind
other countries, a number of which actually have required this kind of access. The
Berkman Center’s report to the FCC in 2010 puts it quite bluntly:
Contrary to perceptions in the United States, there is extensive evidence
to support the position, adopted almost universally by other advanced
economies, that open access policies, where undertaken with serious reg-
ulatory engagement, contributed to broadband penetration, capacity, and
affordability in the first generation of broadband.
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This kind of regulation also clearly makes it much easier to actually enter the
market as a competitor, and countries from Japan to South Korea to Denmark and
France have all had quite a bit of success encouraging competition this way.
4.5 Barriers to Entry
We’re in the business of delivering what consumers want, and to stay a
little ahead of what we think they will want... we just don’t see the need
of delivering [gigabit-per-second Internet] to consumers.
–Irene Esteves, CFO of Time Warner Cable, 2012
Thus far, cable companies have shown very little interest in upgrading their networks.
This may well not be surprising if the threat of entry is seen as relatively remote,
after all the fixed cost of the upgrades is quite large and consumer willingness to
pay for faster service is uncertain in the short term. Much like AoL or T-Mobile, a
failure to invest in the long term will certainly leave these companies with rapidly
dwindling customer bases, but in the short term it can be very profitable to sit back
and milk previous investments.
4.5.1 Capital and Technology
One barrier to entry in the market is obviously the raw capital and technological
sophistication required to get the program off the ground. While companies like
Google, and perhaps to a lesser extent Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple, may have the
technical expertise, warchests in the billions, and an incentive to expand the number
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of consumers with broadband Internet access, the number of potential entrants there
is relatively limited. Smaller startup companies like Gigabit Squared may have the
technical expertise but are very likely to have difficulty raising the capital until their
smaller projects have proven to be successful.
4.5.2 Collusion
Another possible barrier to entry is collusion, either between current providers or
between providers and other companies with the capital and technical knowledge to
enter the space. In conversations a number of government regulators have admitted
that they privately have concerns along these lines, but proving issues like this is
notoriously difficult. A number of recent examples may prove illuminating:
 Verizon, once seen as a possibly disruptive entrant into the market with FiOS,
seems content to simply pick the lowest hanging fruit, and has publicly ruled
out any geographical expansion of service.
 The Department of Justice had to step in in August of 2012 to block a proposed
cross-marketing agreement between Verizon and major cable providers. The
original deal would have had Verizon selling cable Internet access on behalf of
four of the largest cable companies in markets where its’ own FiOS was a direct
competitor. Even after DoJ review, the agreement requires Verizon to share
information about not only where it currently operates FiOS but also where it
will become available in the future.
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 In 2010 a conglomerate of cable, satellite, and phone companies struck a
deal with a number of TV distributors that prevents those distributors from
offering online content to any customer that does not currently have a ca-
ble/satellite/DSL account.12 The original deal even called for cable companies
to only offer online services in their traditional geographic regions to prevent
them from competing for customers.
This list is nowhere near exhaustive, for further reading see Crawford (2013) and
Free Press [2010], among others.
4.5.3 Local Regulation
The last major barrier to entry, and perhaps the most troublesome, is the enor-
mous patchwork of state and local regulations combined with the willingness of the
current incumbents to use them as a weapon to fight entry tooth and nail. Even
Google’s fiber project in Kansas City, despite being incredibly well funded, has had
to get serious concessions from the local governments involved. The company’s 2011
testimony to congress singled out the rights-of-way issue as a problem in many places.
Governments across the country control access to the rights-of-way that
private companies need in order to lay fiber. And government regulation
of these rights-of-way often results in unreasonable fees, anti-investment
terms and conditions, and long and unpredictable build-out timeframes.
The expense and complexity of obtaining access to public rights-of-way
12Implementation has been slow due to both technical issues and industry infighting, but the
nature of the deal is nevertheless remarkable.
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in many jurisdictions increase the cost and slow the pace of broadband
network investment and deployment.
–Milo Medin, Google Inc., 2011 testimony to Congress
In addition to the regulations already in place, incumbent providers have often man-
aged to use State law to their advantage to stifle competition, particularly in areas
where local governments were interested in providing access. For instance, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee have laws that prohibit local
governments from providing high-speed Internet access even in areas without any
access whatsoever, and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida are all considering
passing similar measures. The current situation has strong similarities to the early
1900s when a small handful of private electrical utilities controlled 85% of power
generation and moved unsuccessfully to prevent public utilities from opening.
4.6 Bundling and Screening
The so-called triple play packages (Internet, Television, Telephony) that service
providers almost universally offer are a classic example of bundling to make consumers
more homogeneous. Consumers only have so much leisure time to devote to either TV
or the Internet (and there are many online options for getting television content), so
consumers with a high value for the Internet are likely to put a low value on TV and
vice-versa. In addition, service providers offer a number of tiers of quality for both
Internet and TV separately in order to screen their customers by willingness to pay.
The result is that Internet service providers almost universally engage in both mixed
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bundling and screening their customers which makes the industry quite unusual. I
am unaware of any literature looking specifically at the potential for bundling and
screening together to foreclose entry so we will consider each part separately.
4.6.1 Bundling
Classic models like Schmalensee (1984), McAfee et al. (1989), Salinger (1995),
and Armstrong (1996) suggest that bundling gives rise to effective price discrimi-
nation. In addition, an extensive literature suggests that bundling also acts as an
effective deterrent for entry.
Papers like Whinston (1989) and Matutes and Regibeau (1992) suggest that
a commitment to mixed bundling by a monopoly might sufficiently lower industry
profits enough to make entry unprofitable. A number of models of oligopoly like
Crampes and Hollander (2005) and Reisinger (2004) suggest that bundling can in-
crease competition between firms. Essentially, because the bundles make consumers
more homogeneous it is much more difficult for firms to differentiate themselves by
only serving niche markets. Given the evidence above, however, it does not appear
that entry is really being deterred by intense competition or low prices in the sector.
An alternative explanation for the entry deterrence factor of bundling comes
from Nalebuff (2004). The intuition is that a company with market power over two
goods may be able to use bundling to make it very difficult for entry by a rival
who sells only one good. This seems like an apt description of the cable market,
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and indeed surveys suggest that consumers have a very strong preference for one-
stop-shopping in this area. Research from both the US (See Bughin and Mendonc¸a
(2007), IDC (2005/10)) and Europe (Isern and Perdomo (2005)) claim that more
than half of consumers strongly prefer bundles and only 40% would even consider
switching to another provider which only offered Internet. This is also consistent
with the experience of Cox in Europe where the introduction of triple play bundles
reduced customer churn by over 30%. Even Google felt the need to offer a combined
Internet and Television bundle in Kansas City. This obviously has a deterrent effect
on entry because it requires new entrants to either accept a much smaller possible
customer base or simultaneously enter an additional market that may be well away
from their core competency.
On a somewhat more positive note, Armstrong and Vickers (2010) present an
oligopoly model that explicitly includes a consumer preference for one stop shopping
and conclude that if firms can offer nonlinear prices the result can be efficient two-part
tariffs.13
4.6.2 Screening
Screening is typically seen as a price discrimination measure for companies with-
out direct competitors rather than a way of keeping entrants out, but in this case
it seems like there is the potential for both because of adverse selection. Armstrong
13Of course, firms are not currently charging two-part tariffs in the wired sector, so the result
may not be all that relevant in this context.
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(1996) and Mary Margaret (1981) present classic models using different quality levels
to screen customers with the eventual result that only the highest-paying customers
get the socially optimal quality. Armstrong and Rochet (1999) extends this result
to a case where companies are offering multiple products with varying qualities.
They show that the optimal result for the monopoly when consumers’ valuations are
negatively correlated is to bundle and again distort the quality downward for the
consumers willing to pay the least.
Given the nature of high-bandwidth applications, however, it is not clear that
the customers willing to pay the most for Internet access are the ones who would
most benefit from faster services. One of the most bandwidth-intensive applications,
for instance, is peer-to-peer file transfers: something that certainly can be legal, but
more often than not is actually intellectual piracy. If the highest cost customers
are the ones most likely to switch but not the ones most likely to pay, however, an
entrant would need to significantly undercut the competition in order to avoid the
kind of adverse selection effect mentioned in Section 4.3.
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4.7 Conclusion
How often have I said to you that when you eliminate the impossible,
whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?
–Sherlock Holmes
Competition in the market for last-mile Internet access could be increased either by
the current providers expanding their geographic range or new providers entering the
market. The failure of current providers to expand is relatively difficult to explain
without collusion as expansion is highly likely to be profitable, they have access to
both the required capital and technological expertise, and the issues surrounding
bundling and screening do not really apply in this context.
As a result of that lack of expansion, however, there is clearly space for new
entrants in the last mile Internet access market. This is especially true in a somewhat
longer time horizon because the current providers are uninterested in investing in next
generation technology. The current lack of entry can probably be attributed to some
combination of capital constraints, local regulations, and bundling.
Changes to federal regulation could be enormously beneficial simply because
dealing with separate rules on a municipality-by-municipality basis is surely pro-
hibitively expensive. While I suspect that an open bitstream access regulation would
have the largest overall effect, local loop unbundling or addressing the smorgasboard
of local regulations that make entry so difficult would be smaller steps that would
likely yield strong dividends.
Appendix A
Appendix for Subscription Content
A.1 Nash Equilibrium Under Net Neutrality
Claim: Under Net Neutrality the only Nash Equilibrium is for content providers
to charge
p1 = p2 =
η
1 + θw
+mc
for the ISP to charge
a =
V
1 + w
+
1− (3/2)η
1 + θw
−mc
and for all consumers to purchase Internet access and service from the closest content
provider.
Proof:
A.1.1 Consumers
Given the prices above all consumers get at least utility 0 from purchasing
Internet access and a content subscription. The worst off consumer is xi = 0.5 who
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has
U(0.5) =
V
1 + w
+
1− ηxi
1 + θw
− a− p1 = 0
By our competition assumption above p1 ≤ WTP1(0.5) so every consumer with
Internet access is strictly better off purchasing content than not.
A.1.2 ISP
Given the behavior of consumers and the price set by content providers the
ISP’s optimal price is
a =
V
1 + w
+
1− (3/2)η
1 + θw
−mc
Charging less is clearly less profitable since there are no new customers able to enter
the market. If the ISP charges more it instead has profit pi = aD(a) where demand
D(a) = 2
(
1− (1 + θw)(a+mc− V
1+w
)
η
− 1
)
The first order condition on profit gives
0 = D(a) + aD′(a) = 2
(
1− (1 + θw)(a+mc− V
1+w
)
η
− 1
)
− a2
(
1 + θw
η
)
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It is sufficient to show that this derivative is negative for every a greater than or
equal to the equilibrium price. Rearranging a bit gives
2a ≥ 1− η
1 + θw
−mc+ V
1 + w
Obviously if this is true for a = V
1+w
+ 1−(3/2)η
1+θw
−mc it will be true for every larger a
as well. Plugging that in gives
V
1 + w
−mc+ 1− 2η
1 + θw
≥ 0
By our competition assumption the upper bound for eta is η ≤ (2/3)(1−mc(1+θw)).
Thus in the worst case we need
V ≥ 1 + w
3
(
1
1 + θw
−mc
)
A.1.3 Content Providers
Given the equilibrium a and p2, if content provider 1 sets a price to p1 it will
have demand
D1(p1) = 1/2− (p1 − p2)(1 + θw)
2η
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Since profit for content provider 1 is pi1 = D1(p1)(p1 −mc) the first order condition
gives us
1 + θw
2η
(p1 −mc) = 1/2− (p1 − p2)(1 + θw)
2η
Simplifying
2p1 =
η
1 + θw
+mc+ p2
Using a similar derivation, content provider 2’s optimal response function is
2p2 =
η
1 + θw
+mc+ p1
Which implies that the optimal prices are
p1 = p2 =
η
1 + θw
+mc
QED
A.2 Nash Equilibrium Under Dual Priority
Claim:Under dual priority it is optimal for content providers to charge
p1 = p2 = η +mc
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for the ISP to charge an access fee
a =
V
1 + βw
+ 1− (3/2)η −mc
and a prioritization fee
g =
η
2
θw
1 + θw
and for all consumers to purchase Internet access and service from the closest content
provider.
Proof: This situation is almost identical to the one before only the requirement on
V is
V ≥ 1 + βw
3
(1−mc)
which may be stronger or weaker than the previous one depending on the values of
β, θ, and w but is again is typically weaker than V ≥ 1
A.3 Nash Equilibrium Under Single Priority
Claim: Under single priority it is a Nash Equilibrium for everyone to act as
listed in Section 2.2.3 for any V ≥ 1.
Proof: Optimality for content providers and consumers is worked out in Section
2.2.3 so what remains is to prove that the ISP does not want to increase the price
of Internet access. Consider the ISP’s profit function pi(a) = aD(a) + gS(a) which
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gives rise to a first order condition
dpi(a)
da
= D(a) + a
dD(a)
da
+
gS(a)
da
If the derivative is negative for all a greater than or equal to the NE one then the ISP
can not do better by deviating. First, note that dgS(a)/da must be negative. This
term represents the change in what the ISP can charge for priority access, but since
increasing a forces consumers out of the market, content providers will necessarily
be willing to pay less for priority service.
Second, define x¯1(a) as the consumer just indifferent between purchasing Inter-
net access and content from provider 1 and not purchasing anything at all. Likewise,
define x¯2 as the just indifferent consumer for content type 2. We can therefore write
D(a) = x¯1 + 1− x¯2 and dD(a)/da = dx¯1/da− dx¯2/da
x¯1 : 1− ηx¯1 + V
1 + βSw
− a
x¯1 = 1/η
[
V
1 + βSw
+ 1− a
]
dx¯1
da
= −1/η
x¯2 :
ηx¯2
1 + βSθw
+
V
1 + βSw
− a = 0
x¯2 =
1 + βSθw
η
[
a+
V
1 + βSw
]
dx¯2
da
= (1 + βSθw)/η
This gives
D(a) + a
dD(a)
da
= x¯1 + 1− x¯2 − a2 + β
Sθw
η
The first part x¯1 +1− x¯2 is by definition always less than or equal to 1 and decreasing
in a while the second part is clearly decreasing in a since all of the other parameters
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are strictly positive. Thus if this whole term is negative for the NE value of a it will
continue to be negative at every larger value of a. At the NE x¯1 = x¯2 = x¯ so this
simplifies to
1− a2 + β
Sθw
η
≥ 0
or
a ≥ η
2 + βSθw
Since a ≥ V
1+βSw
this is trivially satisfied as long as
V
1 + βSw
≥ η
2 + βSθw
or
V ≥ η 1 + β
Sw
2 + βSθw
Since η < 2/3 this will be satisfied for any V ≥ 1
Appendix B
Appendix for Advertising Content
B.1 Wait Times
As noted in Section 3.2.2, the most likely prioritization scheme is equivalent
to having a single security screening lane at an airport and simply moving ’priority
traffic’ to the head of the line whenever it comes in. This kind of system is often
modeled as an M/M/1 queuing system since empirically it appears to do an excellent
job of predicting wait times.1 The major results of that model are:
If the ISP has invested in bandwidth µ and the request rate for information is
λ then the average wait time for content will be
w(µ, λ) =
1
µ− λ
1For more discussion of this model and an example of its application see Kra¨mer & Wiewiorra
2010.
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If some subset of traffic λ1 has priority over the rest, the wait time for priority
traffic will be
w1(µ, λ1) =
1
µ− λ1
and the wait time for non-priority traffic will be
w2(µ, λ1, λ2) =
1
µ− λ
µ
µ− λ1
Using this model directly in the paper would be ideal but proves technically in-
tractable so I’ve linearized things a bit.
 Without prioritization the wait time is determined solely by the overall level of
investment and the total traffic. Since bandwidth is fixed in the short run this
effectively makes the wait time a function of traffic. As long as the total traffic
to the two content providers in the model is relatively small, the wait time will
be almost constant.
 If the amount of prioritized traffic is very small compared to the overall band-
width, the wait time for priority traffic will be very nearly zero.
 The wait time for traffic without priority can be rewritten as w2 = wβ(λ1) If
the overall amount of traffic given priority is relatively constant then this can
be simplified to w2 = βw
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B.2 Sufficient Conditions on V for Nash Equilibria
B.2.1 Under Net Neutrality
Claim: The ISP is always best off offering
a =
V
1 + w
+
.5
1 + θw
Proof: The ISP’s profit function is
piISP = aD(a, θ, w)
For any value of a less than or equal to the NE demand is simply equal to 1 because
all customers are strictly better off buying Internet access, so lowering its’ price would
only decrease profits. If the ISP increases the price above the NE value the indifferent
consumer is now x¯ such that
V
1 + w
+
1− x¯
1 + θw
− a = 0
x¯ = 1− (1 + θw)
[
a− V
1 + w
]
Thus demand is
D(a, θ, w) = 2x¯ = 2− 2(1 + θw)
[
a− V
1 + w
]
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The derivative of the profit function with respect to a is therefore
dpi
da
= D(a, θ, w) + a
dD(a, θ, w)
da
= 2
[
1− 2a(1 + θw) + V 1 + θw
1 + w
]
If this derivative is negative for all a larger than or equal to the NE value then the ISP
will never be better served by increasing the price. Furthermore, since the derivative
is strictly decreasing in a if it is negative for the NE value then it will be negative
for any larger value of a.
1− 2a(1 + θ2) + V 1 + θw
1 + w
= 1− 2
[
V
1 + w
+
.5
1 + θw
]
(1 + θw) + V
1 + θw
1 + w
dpi
da
= −V 1 + θw
1 + w
Since all parameters in the model are positive the derivative will always be negative
and the ISP will never want to deviate upwards.
B.2.2 Under Dual Priority
Claim: The ISP is always best off offering
a =
V
1 + βw
+ 1/2
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Proof: The ISP’s profit function is
piISP = aD(a, θ, w) + g(a)
For any value of a less than or equal to the NE demand is simply equal to 1 because
all customers are strictly better off buying Internet access, so lowering its’ price would
only decrease profits. If the ISP increases the price above the NE value the indifferent
consumer is now x¯ such that
V
1 + βw
+ 1− x¯− a = 0
x¯ = 1 +
V
1 + βw
− a
Thus demand is
D(a, θ, w) = 2x¯ = 2 + 2
V
1 + βw
− 2a
The derivative of the profit function with respect to a is therefore
dpi
da
= 2x¯ = 2 + 2
V
1 + βw
− 4a+ dg(a)
da
If this derivative is negative for all a larger than or equal to the NE value then the
ISP will never be better served by increasing the price. Recall that g depends on
the willingness to pay of content providers for priority access which in turn relies on
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the amount of additional traffic that said priority generates. Since increasing a past
the NE point decreases the number of consumers (and thus the traffic to content
providers) it must be the case that dg(a)/da < 0 for all values of a above the NE.
For the other part of the derivative, since it is strictly decreasing in a if it is
negative for the NE value then it will be negative for any larger value of a.
2 + 2
V
1 + βw
− 4a = 2 + 2 V
1 + βw
− 4
[
V
1 + βw
+ .5
]
dpi
da
= −2 V
1 + βw
Since all parameters in the model are positive the derivative will always be negative
and the ISP will never want to deviate upwards.
B.2.3 Under Single Priority
Claim: The ISP is always best off offering
a =
V
1 + βSw
+ 1− x¯ = V
1 + βSw
+
x¯
1 + βSθw
Proof: The ISP’s profit function is
piSISP = aD(a, θ, w) + g
S(a)
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As before, it is sufficient to show that the derivative is negative for every value of
a greater than or equal to the NE value. Things are no longer symmetric, however,
so things are slightly more complicated. For some value of a above the NE, define
x¯1(a) and x¯2(a) as the consumers just indifferent between no access and access using
content providers 1 and 2 respectively. Setting
V
1 + βSw
+ 1− x¯1 − a = 0
x¯1 =
V
1 + βSw
+ 1− a
Similarly
V
1 + βSw
+
x¯2
1 + βSθw
− a = 0
x¯2 = (1 + β
Sθw)
[
a− V
1 + βSw
]
By construction this gives D(a, θ, w) = x¯1 + 1 − x¯2 Thus the ISP’s overall profit
function is
piSISP = aD(a, θ, w) + g
S(a)
and the FOC give us
D(a, θ, w) + a
dD(a, θ, w)
da
+
dgS(a)
da
x¯1 + 1− x¯2 + a
[
dx¯1
da
− dx¯2
da
]
+
dgS(a)
da
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where
dx¯1
da
= −1
dx¯2
da
= 1 + βSθw
gS(a) = r2
[
δS1 (a)− δS2 (a)
]
δS1 (a) = x¯1 − 0.5(x¯1)2
δS2 (a) =
0.5(1− (x¯2)2)
1 + βSθw
dgS(a)
da
= r2
[
dδS1 (a)
da
− dδ
S
2 (a)
da
]
dδS1 (a)
da
= −1 + x¯1
dδSd (a)
da
= −x¯2
Substituting gives
x¯1 + 1− x¯2 − a
[
2 + βSθw
]
+ r2 [−1 + x¯1 + x¯2]
Since x¯1 + x¯2 < 1 for any a above the NE value the right hand part of the term is
always negative. It is sufficient, then, to show x¯1 + 1− x¯2− a
[
2 + βSθw
]
< 0 Again,
note that this term is strictly decreasing in a so if it is negative for the NE value it
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will be negative for every a above that. At the NE x¯1(a) = x¯2(a) so this simplifies to
1−
[
V
1 + βSw
+ 1− x¯
]
(2 + βSθw)
Furthermore
1− x¯ = 1− 1 + β
Sθw
2 + βSθw
=
1
2 + βSθw
So we get
−V 2 + β
Sθw
1 + βSθw
≤ 0
Which, once again, is trivially satisfied when all parameters are positive.
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B.3 Proof that the ISP’s Incentive for DP is Too Low
Claim: The ISP’s incentive to implement dual priority piDPISP − piNNISP is always
less than the social benefit of dual priority TSDP − TSNN
Proof: We want to show that TSDP − TSNN ≥ piDPISP − piNNISP
Substitution gives:
(r1 + r2 + 2)(3/8−
3/8
1 + θw
) ≥ 1/2 + (3/4)r2 θw
1 + θw
−
1/2
1 + θw
Simplifying yields (r1 + r2 + 2)(3/4) ≥ 1 + 3/2r2 or r1 + 2/3 ≥ r2 which is necessarily
true since r1 ≥ r2 by assumption.
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